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I. INTRODUCTION
When Edward Snowden's revelations emerged in June 2013 about
the extent to which the National Security Agency was secretly
gathering communications data as part of the country's massive 9/11-
induced effort to catch terrorists, the administration of Barack Obama
set in motion a program to pursue him to the ends of the earth in
order to have him prosecuted to the full extent of the law for illegally
exposing state secrets.
However, the President also said that the discussions about the
programs these revelations triggered have actually been a good thing:
"I welcome this debate. And I think it's healthy for our democracy. I
think it's a sign of maturity because probably five years ago, six years
ago, we might not have been having this debate."1
There may be something a bit patronizing in the implication that
the programs have been secret because we were not yet mature
enough to debate them when they were put into place. Setting that
aside, however, a debate is surely to be welcomed-indeed, much
overdue. It should be conducted not only about the National Security
Agency's (NSA) amazingly extensive data-gathering programs to
* John Mueller is a professor of political science at Ohio State University and a Senior
Fellow at the Cato Insitute. Mark G. Stewart is a professor of engineering at the University
of Newcastle, Australia.
1 President Barack Obama, Statement by the President at the Fairmont Hotel, San Jose,
California (June 7, 2013), available at http://vwwv.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/o6/07/statement-president.
IS: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
amass information on telephone and e-mail conversations-programs
that have, according to the President, included "modest
encroachments" on privacy-but also more generally about the
phenomenal expansion of intelligence and policing efforts in the wake
of 9/11.2
As Dana Priest and William Arkin have documented in their
remarkable book, Top Secret America, by 2009 there were around
1,074 federal government organizations and almost 2,000 private
companies devoted to counterterrorism, homeland security, and
intelligence spread over more than 17,000 locations within the
country. At least 263 of these were created or reorganized after 9/11.
Collectively this apparatus launched far more covert operations in the
aftermath of 9/11 than it had during the entire 45 years of the Cold
War.3
A comparison might be useful. Since 9/11, 54 cases have come to
light of Islamist extremist terrorism, whether based in the United
States or abroad, in which the United States itself has been, or
apparently has been, targeted.4 The total number of real terrorists,
would-be terrorists, and putative terrorists populating this set of
cases, excluding FBI and police undercover operatives, is around loo.
Thus, the United States has created or reorganized more than two
entire counterterrorism organizations for every terrorist arrest or
apprehension it has made of people plotting to do damage within the
country.
Although much of the discussion in this article can be extrapolated
more widely, it focuses primarily on one of the two surveillance
programs revealed by Snowden. These two programs have often been
confused.5
One of the programs, PRISM, somewhat more commonly known
as (section) 702, permits NSA to gather electronic communication
2 Id.
3 DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW
AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 12, 86 (2011).
4 See TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: THE AMERICAN CASES (John Mueller, ed., 2014), available at
http://politicalseience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/since.html.
5 For useful discussion of the two programs, see Walter Pincus, NSA Should Be Debated on
the Facts, WASH. POST, July 29, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-should-be-debated-on-the-facts/2013/07/29/d57d251e-f63e-11e2-a2fl-
a7acf9bd5d3a-story.html. On "known or unknown," see In re Application of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from,
No. BR 13-1o9 at 18, (FISC 2013). See also Julian Sanchez, Decoding the Summer of
Snowden, 35 CATO POL'Y REP. 5, 1, 6-8 (2013).
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information on e-mail and phone conversations after approval by a
judge if the target is both outside the United States and not an
American citizen and if there is an appropriate and documented
foreign intelligence purpose for the collection.
The other program, known as 215, authorizes the gathering in bulk
of business and communication records within the United States. It
has been used in particular to amass telephone billing records-
numbers called, numbers received, and conversation length-
potentially for every telephone in the U.S. In principle, the 215 data
are only supposed to be collected if there are "reasonable grounds to
believe" the records are "relevant" to a terrorist investigation of a
"known or unknown" terrorist organization or operative. Creatively
expanding the word "relevant" to the breaking point, it has been taken
in practice to mean that NSA can gather billing records for every
telephone conversation in the country: if there might be a known or
unknown needle in the haystack, the entire haystack becomes
"relevant." As many, including Senator Patrick Leahy, have pointed
out, this broad approach could also be applied to banking, credit card,
medical, financial, and library records, all of which could be held as
reasonably to be somehow "relevant" to the decidedly wide-ranging
quest to catch terrorists. The information gathered by either program
can be held for five years.
This article primarily deals with the more controversial 215
program, which involves the massive gathering of telephone billing
records, or "metadata," within the United States. In the burgeoning
debate since Snowden's revelations, a number of questions have been
raised about the civil liberties and privacy implications of the NSA's
massive surveillance efforts. This article focuses on three additional
questions. None of these are terribly legalistic, but they are questions
that ought to be given more thorough examination.
The first two-why was the program secret and how much does it
cost?-never seem to come up even though they are crucial if we are
going to have an adult conversation on the issue. The third-what has
the program accomplished?-has attracted some attention, but it
clearly needs much more, and this article examines it at some length
in the broader context of the obsessive and massively expensive efforts
by police and intelligence since 9/11 to deal with the threat that is
envisioned to be presented by terrorism, a quest that has involved
following literally millions of leads that go nowhere. 6
6 For commentary on the often-bizarre quality of this quest, see John Mueller & Mark G.
Stewart, The Terrorism Delusion: America's Overwrought Response to September 11, 37
INT'L SEC. 1, 81-110 (Summer 2012).
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Although those opposed to the program are deeply concerned
about privacy issues, they have also argued that the program fails to
be "an effective counterterrorism tool," in the words of Senator
Leahy.7 In December 2013, two judges came to opposite conclusions
about the 215 metadata program, and it is clear the program's
effectiveness figured importantly in their decisions. Judge Richard J.
Leon, in finding that the program was likely unconstitutional, noted
that the government "does not cite a single instance" in which analysis
of bulk metadata collection "actually stopped an imminent attack,"
failed to present "any indication of a concrete danger," and provided
"no proof that the program prevented terrorist attacks."8 Eleven days
later, Judge William Pauley, in approving the program, stressed in his
first sentence that the world is "dangerous and interconnected" and
went on to insist that the effectiveness of the data collection program
"cannot seriously be disputed, " noting that the "the Government has
acknowledged several successes in Congressional testimony and in
declarations."9 Meanwhile, a special Presidential group set up to
review the NSA programs, while focusing mostly on legal issues,
noted, in recommending the termination of 215 as currently operated,
that information provided by the program "was not essential to
preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely
manner" and that "there has been no instance in which NSA could say
with confidence that the outcome would have been different" without
the program. 10
In all this, the key question, as the Presidential review group
points out, is not whether a surveillance program "makes us
incrementally safer, but whether the additional safety is worth the
sacrifice in terms of individual privacy, personal liberty, and public
7 Ellen Nakashima, NSA Bills Set Up A Choice in Congress: End Bulk Collection of Phone
Records or Endorse It, WASH. POST, Oct.28, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-bills-set-up-a-choice-in-
congress -end-bulk-collection-of-phone-records-or-endorse-it/2013/10/28/9900788o-
3fd5- e3-a751-fo32898f2dbestory.html.
8 Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-o851, 2013 WL 6571596, at *24 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013)
(emphasis in original).
9 ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994 at *48-49 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 27, 2013), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/order-granting-governments-motion to dismiss-an
d-denying-aclu motion for-preliminary injunction.pdf.
10 Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations of The
President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies 104, 119
n.ii9 (President's Review Grp. on Intelligence and Comm'n Tech., Dec. 12, 2013), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/does/2013-12-12-rg-final-report.pdf.
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trust."11 The analysis in this article suggests that any benefit of the 215
metadata program is considerably outweighed by its cost even
assuming that the unknown, and perhaps unknowable, cost figure is
quite small. If the issue is security versus privacy, in this case, privacy
wins.
II. WHY WAS THE 215 PROGRAM SECRET?
Under Executive Order 135256, classification is permitted if
"disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to
result in damage to the national security, which includes defense
against transnational terrorism." The order continues: "If there is
significant doubt about the need to classify information, it shall not be
classified." 12 There is also a classification level of top secret. As
defined in Executive Order 12356, top secret is "applied to
information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be
expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security."
13
It is difficult to see how earlier exposure of the program's existence
would have damaged national security, gravely or otherwise. No one
seems to be saying that the Snowden documents put undercover
intelligence operatives or operations overseas or elsewhere in danger
of being exposed, that the documents reveal military secrets about
weapons, or that they compromise United States strategy or tactics.
Instead, we get such vague, atmospheric pronouncements to the press
as that from outgoing FBI Director Robert Mueller in August 2013:
"Mueller said that leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden
'have impacted, and [are] in the process of impacting, capabilities
around the world,' but when asked to expand on this, he said simply,
'No details." '14 Even less helpful has been the expression of "belief'
promulgated by NSA chief Keith B. Alexander: "Based on what we
"Id. at 114.
12 Jim Harper, John Mueller, & Mark Stewart, Comments on Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking: Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, TSA-2013-0004
(RIN1652-AA67), CATO INSTITUTE (June 21, 2013), available at
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/wp-content/uploads/cato tsa comments.pdf.
13 PRIEST &ARKIN, supra note 3 at n.1O.
14 Billy Kenber, Outgoing Director Robert S. Mueller, III Tells How 9/11 Reshaped FBI
Mission, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/outgoing-director-robert-s-mueller-iii-tells-how-911-reshaped-fbi-
mission/2013/o8/22/ee452170-ob54-1e3-9941-67n1ed662e71_story.html.
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know to date, we believe these disclosures have caused significant and
irreversible harm to the security of the nation."15
Of course, terrorists have surely known at least since the 1990s
(when Osama bin Laden ceased talking on a satellite phone) that
United States intelligence is searching communications worldwide to
track them down. 16 Year after year we have heard about "chatter" that
has been picked up by official agencies, and one certainly must
conclude that it has dawned on the chatterers that there are extensive
efforts to listen in. The terrorists may not know the precise number,
but they are likely to be at least dimly aware-and are unlikely to be
surprised-that the NSA, in its tireless quest to conduct its global war
on terror, intercepts and ingests 1.7 billion communication elements
every day. These include, note Priest and Arkin, "telephone calls, radio
signals, cell phone conversations, emails, text and Twitter messages,
bulletin board postings, instant messages, website changes, computer
network pings, and IP addresses."17 It is possible that the current
revelations will impress the terrorists even further about the extent of
the surveillance effort. But even if that is so, the main effect of the
revelations would be to make their efforts to communicate even more
difficult and inconvenient-far more than the revelations would
facilitate communication.
Conceivably, as some maintain, some exceptionally dim-witted
terrorists or would-be terrorists who are oblivious to the fact that their
communications are less than fully secure could exist. But such
supreme knuckle-heads are surely likely to make so many mistakes-
like advertising on Facebook or searching there or in chat-rooms for
co-conspirators-that sophisticated and costly communications data
banks are scarcely needed to track them down.18
Some defenders of the program have creatively argued that
exposure of the 215 program has aided terrorists because they now
know that NSA is gathering only metadata on telephone calls in the
15 Shane Harris, The Cowboy of the NSA, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/o9/o8/the-cowboy of the nsa keith-alex
ander.
16 Mary Lu Carnevale, Tracking Use of Bin Laden's Satellite Phone, WALL ST. J. (May 28,
2008), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/05/28/traeldng-use-of-bin-ladens-satellite-
phone.
17 PRIEST &ARKIN, supra note 3 at 77.
18 See, e.g., cases 16, 30, 39, 40, 41, 48, 51, and 52 in TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: THE AMERICAN
CASES, supra note 4.
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United States, not their content. 19 But, if terrorists or others read past
the first paragraph in the discussions of the 215 program, they can
also note that if any information gathered is deemed suspicious,
investigators can apply for legal authority to record the content of the
communications. They can readily do that as well in the 702 program,
which gathers and monitors both metadata and content. Moreover
terrorists, like many others, are likely to suspect that considerably
more than metadata is gathered even under the 215 program, despite
prominent denials to the contrary.
It is also argued that the program was kept secret in order to
protect private communications companies, like AT&T, Verizon, and
Sprint, which are dutifully supplying the NSA with data. However, the
potential embarrassment of businesses, although a reasonable
concern, is not usually deemed to constitute a threat, grave or
otherwise, to national security and therefore fails to be a legitimate
reason for classification. Moreover, it seems elemental that customers
should be informed about what businesses are doing with confidential
information.
Unkind people might suggest that the real reason these programs
were kept secret actually stems from the administration's fear that
public awareness of their "modest encroachments" on privacy would
make further efforts to encroach more difficult. Thus, Reuters notes
that a former Air Force secretary ominously warns that a "growing
unease about domestic surveillance could have a chilling effect on
proposed cyber legislation that calls for greater information-sharing
between government and industry." Reuters also notes that after the
revelations, more lawmakers signed on to legislation that would
strengthen the privacy protections in the 1986 Electronic
19 Thus, General Michael Hayden on Meet the Press (NBC Television Broadcast June 16,
2013) (transcript available at
http://www.nbenews.com/id/5222o6o9/ns/meet the press-transcripts/t/june-lindsey-
graham-saxby-chambliss-mark-udall-bobby-scott-david-ignatius-james-risen-andrea-
mitchell/#.Uw- S ldVio): "What I fear al-Qaeda learns about this program is not what
we're allowed to do but they learn what we're not allowed to do, and they learn the limits of
the program." Asked on CBS' "Face the Nation" on June 30, 2013, about what harm had
been done, Hayden said, "Look, we cooperate with a lot of governments around the world.
They expect us to be discreet about that cooperation. I can't imagine a government
anywhere on the planet who now believes we can keep a secret." Face the Nation (June 30,
2o13) (transcript available at http://www.ebsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-
june-30-2013-hayden-olson-perkins-and-davis). Although that "harm" is a relevant
concern for programs that are secret, it is scarcely relevant to the issue of why the program
was made secret in the first place. Updating his opinion on "Face the Nation" on December
29, 2013, Hayden declared that the NSA had become "infinitely weaker" because of the
disclosures. Face the Nation (CBS Television Broadcast Dec. 29, 2013) (transcript available
at http://www.ebsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-december-29-2013-
hayden-drake-radack-gellman/2).
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Communications Privacy Act. 20 Perhaps, then, the programs were kept
secret not to protect people from terrorism, but to protect the
government from the annoying and inconvenient public and
Congressional outcry that constitutes the untidy stuff of democracy.
III. How MUCH DOES THE 215 PROGRAM COST?
If we are now to have a healthy debate about 215, NSA's massive
metadata program, it seems reasonable to suggest that debaters
should be supplied with information about how much the program
costs. This information would furnish a key starting point for any
debate.
Presumably, that figure has thus far been classified because the
program itself was classified. But now that we know only too well that
the program exists, why should its cost remain secret? It is difficult to
see how knowing that cost would help the terrorists.
It is possible, however, that the figure for the program remains
undisclosed in part because no one actually knows how much the
program costs. Priest and Arkin suggest that this phenomenon is
widespread. In researching their book, they discovered that the
spending increases on counterterrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 often
took place so fast and so chaotically that no one was able to track the
costs. 21
A. Program, Investigatory, and Opportunity Costs
The direct costs of maintaining the 215 program might be quite
low. However, a full accounting should include not only the actual cost
of gathering and storing the surveillance data, but also the costs of
constantly sorting through it to generate and develop leads. According
to the NSA's director of compliance, the agency queries its databases
about 20 million times each month.22 Presumably that includes both
databases and involves a great deal of human interaction, all of which
must be paid for.
20 Andrea Shalal-Esa & Joseph Menn, U.S. Domestic Spying Controversy Complicates
Cybersecurity Efforts, REUTERS, June 8, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/20 13/o6/o8/us-usa-security-eyberpolicy- analysis-
idUSBRE95702R2013o6o8.
21 PRIEST &ARKIN, supra note 3, at xviii-xix.
22 Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Calls Violations of Privacy Minuscule,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2013
atA12.
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Costs should also include those involved in following up the leads
once they have been generated, discussed in the next section of this
article.
Opportunity costs should also be included in the tally: what else
could the money have been used for? For example, it has often been
noted that the FBI and other agencies have downgraded other
priorities, including the pursuit of white collar crime like fraudulent
banking practices, to focus on the pursuit of (mostly nonexistent)
terrorists. To fully evaluate the costs of the NSA surveillance efforts,
one would need to take this into account.
B. Privacy Costs: The Issue of Trust
In addition, some consideration should be made for the less
quantifiable costs of privacy invasion and for the potential misuse of
the data. Although the program has built-in safeguards, its operation
ultimately requires us to trust those in charge. Citing historical
precedents from the days of Richard Nixon and J. Edgar Hoover and
from the runup to the Iraq War of 2003, Stephen Walt has suggested
(or warned) that the program could be used to intimidate or harass
whistle-blowers, dissidents, and overly-inquisitive journalists: "once
someone raises their head above the parapet and calls attention to
themselves by challenging government policy, they can't be sure that
someone inside government won't take umbrage and try to see what
dirt they can find."23
That officials have several times been caught in lies-or supreme
exercises in Clintonian sophistry-about the NSA programs scarcely
proves that NSA information will be abused, but it certainly enhances
the wariness about the programs.
There is, for example, the response of NSA director Alexander to a
March 2012 cover story in Wired magazine that reported the views of
William Binney, a former NSA official who contended that, without a
warrant, the NSA was collecting "a vast trove of international and
domestic billing records" from major American telephone companies
and that "they're storing everything they gather."24 In the ensuing
months, Alexander blithely denied Binney's contention. "To think
23 Stephen Walt, The Real Threat Behind the NSA Surveillance Programs, FOREIGN POLICY
(June 10, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/o6/1o/what me worry the-real-threat behi
nd the nsa. See also Sanchez, supra note 5.
24 James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country's Biggest Spy Center (Watch Hhat
YOU Say), WIRED.COM:THREAT LEVEL (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2o12/o3/ff nsadatacenter.
2014]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
we're collecting on every US person... that would be against the law..
. The fact is we're a foreign intelligence agency."25 He also categorically
insisted that "we don't hold data on U.S. citizens," a statement that
has been defended by the administration on the grounds that the
NSA's internal definition of "data" does not include "metadata"-a
language-stretching nuance Alexander neglected to mention when he
made his statement. As it happens, however, the agency's actual
internal definition of "data" does specifically include "call event
records and other Digital Network Intelligence metadata. '"26
Then, in March 2013, Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper was asked by Senator Ron Wyden in a Senate Intelligence
Committee hearing, "Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on
millions or hundred of millions of Americans?" Even knowing that
Wyden, due to his position on the committee, knew what the answer
to that question was, Clapper blandly demurred: "No, sir. . .Not
wittingly." Wyden says he had sent the question to Clapper's office the
day before and that Clapper was also given a chance later to amend his
answer. After Snowden's revelations three months later spectacularly
shattered Clapper's crisp denial (as well as Alexander's earlier ones),
Clapper sent a letter to the Committee stating that his answer had
been "clearly erroneous" and that when responding he imagined that
the question referred to content, not metadata which he somehow
believed the NSA does not collect "wittingly." Clapper has also said
that an honest response would have required him to divulge secrets
that were highly classified, and thus he came up with the "least
untruthful" answer he could imagine at the time.27
There is additional evidence of deception in the disclosure that the
NSA illegally collected email content data on thousands, or tens of
thousands, of Americans before that practice was closed down by the
courts in 2011.28 The court's opinion on this was classified, and the
25 James Bamford, They Know Much More Than You Think, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Aug. 15,
2013, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/nsa-they-know-much-
more-you-think/.
26 Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Time Per Year, Audit Finds,
WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-
finds/2013/o8/15/331oe554-o5ca- 1e3-ao7f-49ddc7417125_story.html.
27 Eugene Robinson, We Can Handle the Truth on NSA Spying, WASH. POST, July 4, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/eugene-robinson-we-can-handle-the-truth-on-
nsa-spying/2o13/o7/o4/76ef2c92-e4o8- 11e2-aiie-c2ea876a8f3o-story.html. See also
Bamford, supra note 25.
28 Ellen Nakashima, NSA Gathered Thousands of Americans' E-mails Before Court Struck
Down Program, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2013,
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Obama administration fought a Freedom of Information lawsuit
seeking to get it released.29 In the wake of the Snowden disclosures,
however, the opinion was finally declassified and released in heavily
redacted form. In it, the judge specifically points out that he had
previously been the victim of "a substantial misrepresentation
regarding the scope of a major collection program" and that the
information gathered had been "fundamentally different from what
the court had been led to believe."30
Similar concerns were raised in a 2009 ruling that had originally
been classified as top secret dealing with the way the NSA probed
phone numbers on an "alert list." When it was finally declassified
under pressure in 2013, the ruling included declarations that the
government had failed to comply with the court's orders and had
compounded this by "repeatedly submitting inaccurate descriptions of
the alert process" and that court-approved privacy safeguards had
"been so frequently and systematically violated" that they "never
functioned effectively." A senior official explained rather lamely, but
entirely plausibly, that any violations were "unintentional" because
"there was nobody at N.S.A. who really had a full understanding of
how the program was operating at the time."31
It might be wondered what intentional violations could lead to,
keeping Walt's admonition in mind. Senator Dianne Feinstein, who
chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee, insists that her committee
"has never identified an instance in which the NSA has intentionally
abused its authority to conduct surveillance for inappropriate
purposes." However, the agency's director of compliance has indicated
that there have been a very small number (perhaps one every five
years) of "willful errors."32
The disclosure that in 2oo6 the NSA deliberately weakened an
encryption standard accepted both nationally and internationally in a
systematic effort to defeat privacy protections for Internet
communications, a venture that compromised the National Institute
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationa security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-
americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/o8/21/146ba4b6-oa9o- 1e3-
b87c-476db8ac34cd story.html. See also Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Secret Court
Rebuked N.S.A. on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES Aug. 22, 2013 at Ai.
29 Gellman, supra note 26.
30 Nakashima, supra note 28.
31 Scott Shane, Court Upbraided N.SA. on Its Use of Call-Log Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2013, at A14.
32 Savage, supra note 22.
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of Standards and Technology in the process, is relevant as well to a
discussion of credibility.33
In all this, an assessment of the privacy costs attendant on the
NSA's surveillance efforts should hold in mind, to the degree to which
they apply, warnings about an intimidation factor is suggested in this
passage from George Orwell's novel, 1984:
There was of course no way of knowing whether you
were being watched at any given moment. How often,
or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on
any individual wire was guesswork. It was even
conceivable that they watched everybody all the time.
But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever
they wanted to. You had to live-did live, from habit
that became instinct-in the assumption that every
sound you made was overheard, and, except in
darkness, every movement scrutinized.34
III. WHAT HAS THE 215 PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHED?
Once one knows the cost of the program, one is in a position to
weigh that figure against the benefit the program has generated. The
President insists that the privacy-encroaching programs "help us
prevent terrorist attacks" and therefore "on net, it was worth us
doing."35 However, they are worth us doing only if their benefit, on
net, outweighs their cost-if any gains in security are enough to justify
the privacy and other costs.3 6 And that is a calculation that should be
made, not simply declared.
A. The 911 Atmosphere: Consequences and Persistence
To begin an appraisal of this issue, one must assess the program in
context. It has been only one cog in the massive intelligence-gathering
machine impelled by the trauma of 9/11. The trauma is certainly
33 Shane, supra note 31; Sanchez, supra note 5.
34 Bamford, supra note 25.
35 Statement by the President at the Fairmont Hotel, supra note 1.
36 For an introduction to this process with specific applications to counterterrorism policy,
see JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE
RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2011).
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understandable. But the fears, and therefore the hasty and expensive
actions they inspired, have been substantially inflated. As
anthropologist Scott Atran puts it, "Perhaps never in the history of
human conflict have so few people with so few actual means and
capabilities frightened so many."37
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, recalls
Rudy Giuliani, who was mayor of New York at the time, "anybody, any
one of these security experts, including myself, would have told you on
September 11, 2001, we're looking at dozens and dozens and
multiyears of attacks like this."3S Such fears and concerns were
plausible extrapolations from the facts then at hand. However, that
every "security expert" should hold such erroneous views is
fundamentally absurd. It was also an entirely plausible extrapolation
from facts then at hand that 9/11 could prove to be an aberration
rather than a harbinger.39 Yet it appears that no one in authority could
even imagine that proposition to be true even though it could have
been taken to fit the available information fully as well as the
passionately-embraced alarmist perspective. At any rate, operating
under that apparently unanimous mentality, US intelligence
extravagantly imagined that the number of trained al-Qaeda
operatives in the United States was between 2,ooo and 5,000.40
Over the years, such thinking has been internalized and
institutionalized in a great many ways, and it has proved to be notably
resistant to counter-information. Indeed, officials often seem to live in
what might be called "I think, therefore they are" denial.41 Thus, on
February 11, 2003, a year and a half after 9/11, FBI Director Robert
Mueller assured the Senate Intelligence Committee that "the greatest
37 SCOTT ATRAN, TALKING TO THE ENEMY: FAITH, BROTHERHOOD, AND THE (UN)MAKING OF
TERRORISTS (2010), xiv. See also JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN (2006); Mueller & Stewart
supra note 6.
38 Miles O'Brien & Carol Costello, Giuliani:'Have to Be Relentlessly Prepared,' CNN (July
22, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/07/22/giuliani.
39 John Mueller, Harbinger or Aberration? NATIONAL INTEREST, Sept.i, 2002, at 45; John
Mueller, False Alarms, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2002,
http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/mueller//WPFALSE.PDF; Russell Seitz, Weaker
Than We Think, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, Dec. 6, 2004,
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/weaker-than-we-think/.
4o Bill Gertz, 5,ooo in U.S. Suspected of Ties to al Qaeda; Groups Nationwide Under
Surveillance, WASH. TIMES, July 11, 2002; and Richard Sale, US al Qaida Cells Attacked,
UPI (Oct. 31, 2002), http://www.upi.com/Top News/2002/1o/31/UPI-Special-US-al-
Qaida-cells-attacked/UPI-75381036108294.
41 See Mueller & Stewart, supra note 6.
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threat is from al-Qaeda cells in the US that we have not yet identified."
He somehow judged the threat from those unidentified entities to be
"increasing" and claimed to know that al-Qaeda "maintains the ability
and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the US with little
warning."42 On February 16, 2005, he testified before the same
committee that he remained "very concerned about what we are not
seeing," a sentence rendered in bold lettering in his prepared text.43
By that time, however, an FBI report had concluded that, despite years
of well-funded sleuthing, it had yet to uncover a single true al-Qaida
sleeper cell in the United States.44
Since the number of al-Qaeda operatives actually in the country
came out to be zero or nearly so, and since the threat of terrorism in
the country proved to be far more limited than initially feared-not
even one of the "dozens and dozens" of attacks like 9/11 ever
materialized of course-there might logically have been some
judicious cutbacks to the funds devoted to dealing with the issue in
subsequent years. Far overdue, clearly, are extensive and
transparently-presented studies seeking rationally to evaluate the
massive increases in homeland security expenditures that have taken
place since 9/11-increases that total well over $1 trillion. But virtually
none of this has been done by the administrators in charge.45 Instead
initial, if clearly alarmist, perspectives have substantially been
maintained and vast and hasty increases in spending on homeland
security continue to be perpetuated.
Important in this have been increases in intelligence and policing
as the questing enterprise, central to which is the NSA, continues to be
expanded, searching for the needle by adding more and more hay.
In the process, information has been folded into a "Threat Matrix,"
an itemized catalogue of all the "threats"-or more accurately
"leads"-needing to be followed up. As Garrett Graff explains, the
42 Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States
Senate (Feb. 11, 2003) (testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation), available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003-hr/021103mueller.html.
43 Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States
Senate (Feb. 16, 2005) (testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/global-threats-to-the-
u.s.- and-the-fbis-response-1.
44 Brian Ross, Secret FBIReport Questions Al Qaeda Capabilities: No 'True'Al Qaeda
Sleeper Agents Have Been Found in U.S., ABC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2005),
http://abenews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=566425.
45 For a discussion, see MUELLER & STEWART, supra note 36 at 1-9.
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government pursues "upwards of 5,000 threats per day."46 Impelled
by what some have called "The 9/11 Commission Syndrome"-an
obsession with the career dangers in failing "to connect the dots"-it is
in no one's interest to cull the threats "because it was possible you'd
cull the wrong threat and end up, after the next attack, at the green
felt witness table before the next congressional inquiry."47
Consequently, the Threat Matrix "tracks all the unfolding terrorist
plots and intelligence rumors" and is "filled to the brim with whispers,
rumors, and vacuous, unconfirmed information."48 In result, "claims
that ordinarily wouldn't have made it past the intake agent, claims
that wouldn't even be written down weeks earlier, suddenly became
the subject of briefs to the President in the Oval Office."49 Graff
supplies an example. One entry in the Threat Matrix is crisply cited as
"a threat from the Philippines to attack the United States unless
blackmail money was paid." It turns out that this entry was based on
an e-mail that said, "Dear America. I will attack you if you don't pay
me 999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 dollars.
MUHAHAHA."50
If, aided by the Threat Matrix, the government pursues some 5000
"threats" or leads each day, and if each lead takes an average of a half
a week to investigate, the FBI has pursued some six million or more of
them over the years since 9/11-a process that has led to, at the very
most, a few hundred prosecutions, most of them on minor charges.51
Moreover, whatever the ratio of needle to hay, living with the
Threat Matrix seems to take a psychological toll on its daily readers.
As Graff vividly describes the process, the Threat Matrix comes off as
"a catalogue of horrors," as the "daily looming prognoses of
Armageddon," and as "a seeming tidal wave of Islamic extremist anger
that threatened to unhinge American society," and it could become
46 GARRETT M. GRAFF, THE THREAT MATRIX: THE FBI AT WAR IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL
TERROR 399 (2011).
47 Id. at 400.
48 Id. at 344, 345.
49 Id. at 344.
5o Id. at 398. Graff reports that the FBI dutifully ran down the e-mail's author and sent
information to Philippine police who then paid a visit to the would-be extortionist's
parents.
51 CENTER ON LAW AND SECURITY, TERRORISM TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-
SEPTEMBER 11, 2009 (20o), available at
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/o/documents/o2_TrRCFinalJan142.pdf.
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"all-consuming and paralyzing"-as one reader puts it, "Your mind
comes to be dominated by the horrific consequences of low-
probability events."52 In essence, it is like being barricaded in an
apartment and listening only to the police radio for information about
what is going on outside. Or one reader offers another comparison:
"Reading the Threat Matrix every day is like being stuck in a room
listening to loud Led Zeppelin music," and, after a while, you begin to
suffer from "sensory overload" and become "paranoid" about the
threat."53 Recalls former CIA Director George Tenet, "You could drive
yourself crazy believing all or even half of what was in it."s4
As Jack Goldsmith, another reader, stresses, "It is hard to
overstate the impact that the incessant waves of threat reports have on
the judgment of people inside the executive branch who are
responsible for protecting American lives." He quotes Tenet, "You
simply could not sit where I did and read what passed across by desk
on a daily basis and be anything other than scared to death about what
it portended." This, writes Goldsmith, captures "the attitude of every
person I knew who regularly read the threat matrix."55 Every person.
Goldsmith's account suggests that the sheer number of "threats,"
combined with the fact that these scarcely ever lead to anything, never
inspired analysts and policymakers to consider the rather plausible, if
arguable, conclusion that there was little or nothing out there to fear.
Rather, it caused them-exclusively it seems-to embrace the dead
opposite: "The want of actionable intelligence combined with a
knowledge of what might happen produced an aggressive, panicked
attitude that assumed the worst about threats. "56 George Tenet agrees
when he talks about "the palpable fear that we felt on the basis of the
fact that there was so much we did not know.57 "Present fears,"
observes Macbeth, "are less than horrible imaginings." Or, in today's
lingo, "Absence of evidence is evidence of existence."
52 GRAFF, supra note 46 at 19, 489, 345, 400.
53JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 72 (2007).
54 GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MYYEARS AT THE CIA 232 (2007).
55 GOLDSMITH, supra note 53 at 72.
56 Id. at 74.
57 60 Minutes (CBS Television Broadcast Apr. 25, 2007), available at
http://www.ebsnews.com/news/george-tenet- at-the-center-of-the-storm.
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B. The NSA: Efforts andAccomplishments
In the panicky aftermath of 9/11, the National Security Agency, the
institution of central concern here, has also expanded massively, and
its computerized surveillance programs have been a central part of
that process. As of 2011, the floor space it occupied matched that of
the Pentagon.58
It is important to evaluate what these programs have
accomplished in order to determine whether "on net" they have been
"worth us doing" in their central mission of countering terrorism.
When asked in June 2013 at Senate hearings if NSA's massive
data-gathering programs were "crucial or critical" in disrupting
terrorist threats, the agency's head, General Keith Alexander,
doggedly testified that in "dozens" of instances the databases "helped"
or were "contributing"-though he did seem to agree with the word
"critical" at one point.59 The key issue for evaluating the programs,
however, given their costs and privacy implications, would be to
determine not whether the huge databases were helpful or
contributing, but whether they were necessary.60
After his testimony, Alexander provided Congress a list of
terrorism cases in which his surveillance measures had helped to
disrupt terrorist plots or to identify suspects. The list reportedly
numbers 54-unsurprisingly, the list itself is classified. On the surface,
this seems to be an amazingly small number for several years' work.
There have been hundreds of terrorism cases in the United States
since 9/11. Some 54 of these, as noted earlier, have led to full-bore
prosecutions for plotting to attack targets in the United States. 61 There
are dozens more that have led to prosecutions for sending or plotting
to send support to terrorists overseas, while a few hundred have
involved terrorism investigations that led to prosecutions on lesser
charges. There have also been hundreds-or perhaps even
58 PRIEST &ARKIN, supra note 3 at 74.
59 Senate Investigates NSA Leak, CNN Newsroom (CNN Television Broadcast June 12,
2013) (transcript available at
http://transcripts.enn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/13o6/12/enr.1.htm).
6o NSA operatives sometimes suggest the program "ultimately completes the picture" or, in
the words of FBI Deputy Director Sean Joyce, "closes the gap" on information on a case.
These formulations ingeniously, if deceptively, create the impression that the information
was necessary. Ellen Nakashima, NSA Cites Case as Success of Phone Data-Collection
Program, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2013,http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-cites-ease-as-success-of-phone-data-collection-
program/2013/o8/o8/fc9l5e5a-feda- ne2-96a8-d3b921co924a-story.html.
61 See in TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: THE AMERICAN CASES, supra note 4.
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thousands-of terrorism cases overseas outside of war zones. If the
NSA programs were so valuable, one would think that investigators on
just about every case would routinely run their information by the
NSA. The exercise would be helpful even if the NSA comes up blank
because that would allow investigators to close off some avenues of
potential investigation that, if pursued, would have proven to be a
waste of time and effort, allowing them to follow leads more likely to
be productive.
An examination of public information on the terrorism cases in
the United States suggests that investigators and prosecutors have not
done so.62 This could be taken to suggest, perhaps, either that they
have only occasionally found the NSA to be a helpful ally or that they
were afraid that if they queried the NSA on the case at hand, the
agency would spew out a raft of leads that would unproductively
clutter and distract their investigation while greatly increasing its
costs.
The experience at the FBI with NSA leads may be suggestive here.
Explains Walter Pincus, if operatives at NSA, sorting through their 215
metadata collection or other sources, uncover "a questionable pattern"
such as "calls to other suspect phones," they send a report to the FBI
for investigation. 63 At NSA this process has sometimes been called
"We Track 'Em, You Whack 'Em."64 The FBI, then, is routinely
supplied with what Graff calls "endless lists of 'suspect' telephone
numbers." When followed up, these "leads" virtually never go
anywhere: of 5ooo numbers passed along, only lO-two-tenths of one
percent-"panned out enough for the bureau to bother" to get court
permission to follow them up. At the FBI, the NSA tips are often called
"Pizza Hut" leads because, following them up, FBI agents "inevitably
end up investigating the local pizza delivery guy." There is, in other
words, not much of anything to "whack." At one point, the generally
diplomatic Robert Mueller bluntly told NSA director Alexander, "You
act like this is some treasure trove; it's a useless time suck." An agent
in the trenches puts it a bit less delicately: "You know how long it
takes to chase 99 pieces of bullshit?"65
62 See, e.g., the case studies in TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: THE AMERICAN CASES, supra note 4.
63 Pincus, supra note 5.
64 Dana Priest, NSA Growth Fueled by Need to Target Terrorists, WASH. POST, July 21,
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-growth-fueled-by-
need-to-target-terrorists/2013/07/21/24c93cf4-fobi iie2-bed3-
b9b6fe264871_story.html.
65 GRAFF, supra note 46 at 527.
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C. The Cases
According to the testimony of an NSA official, of the 54 cases that
were supposedly disrupted by NSA surveillance data, more than 9o
percent involved information from the 702, or PRISM, program which
allows the NSA to intercept communications by targets abroad after
obtaining judicial approval.66 Thus, the 215 program, in which
metadata are accumulated and stored for all telephone calls within the
United States, presumably played a role only in around 5 cases over
the course of the program. According to General Alexander, only 13 of
the 54 cases on the classified list had a "homeland nexus," the others
having occurred in Europe (25), in Asia (11), and in Africa (5).67
Four of the cases, all presumably included in the "homeland
nexus" subset, were publically discussed in Congressional testimony
on June 18, 2013, by Alexander and by Sean Joyce, Deputy Director of
the FBI.68 Insofar as NSA surveillance played a role at all in these
cases, it seems that, in almost all cases, it was the 702 program, not
the 215 one, that was relevant. 69
Although the full array of cases remains classified, Senator Patrick
Leahy has said that the notion that these cases represent disrupted
66 Pincus, supra note 5.
67 Peter Finn, NSA Chief Says Surveillance Programs Helped Thwart Dozens of Plots,
WASH. POST, June 27, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-chief-says -surveillance-programs -helped-thwart-dozens-of-
plots/2013/o6/27/e97aboa2-df7o- 1e2-963a-72d74oe88c2-story.html.
68 A related justification for the data storage program holds that, if it had been in place in
2001, it could have led to finding the location of one of the 9/11 hijackers who was calling a
safe house in Yemen from San Diego. This instance plays an important role in Judge
Pauley's "Memorandum & Order" of December 2013 upholding the surveillance programs.
However, insofar as this justification is valid, it would have been the 702 program that was
relevant, not the 215 program. Moreover, the CIA already was tracking the man's
communications and knew he had entered the United States. It also knew about the calls to
the safe house, but failed to trace the calls even though it had both the ability and authority
to do so. It did not need a vast data bank. Michael German, No NSA Poster Child: The Real
Story of 9/11 Hjacker Khalid al-Mihdhar, DEFENSE ONE (Oct. 16, 2013),
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/ 1o/no-nsa-poster-child-real-story- 911 -hijacker-
khalid-al-mihdhar/72047/?oref=d-interstitial-continue. Justin Elliott, Judge on NSA Case
Cites 9/11 Report, But It Doesn'tActually Support His Ruling, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 28,
2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/fact-cheek-the-nsa-and-sept- 11.
69 Carlo Mufioz, NSA Chief Cites 50 Foiled Plots in Defense of Spying Programs, THE HILL
(June 18, 2013), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/3o6381-nsa-chief-cites-50-foiled-
plots-in -defense-of-spying-programs.
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plots is "plainly wrong." Indeed, "they weren't all plots and they
weren't all thwarted."70
Only one, it appears, relied on the 215 program in any significant
way.71 It is among the four disclosed ones, and it involves a San Diego
cab driver from Somalia who has been convicted of sending the
decidedly non-princely sum of $8,500 to help a designated terrorist
group in Somalia fight Ethiopians who, with US support, had recently
invaded the country. The government had been tapping his telephone
for months, and Director Mueller appears to have singled out this case
as the only one in which the collection of phone data had been
"instrumental," a word, of course, that is not as strong as "crucial" or
"critical" or "necessary."72 Joyce says that an investigation of the
potential case using 215 information that began in October 2007 "did
not find any connection to terrorist activity," but that there was a
breakthrough when NSA connected a San Diego number with a
suspicious contact outside the country using 215.73 However, it is not
clear they needed data bank to sort through. Says Senator Ron Wyden,
investigators had all the information they needed to get a court order
to investigate.74
A correspondent for The Hill breathlessly characterizes the cab
driver culprit as "a top terrorist financier in San Diego, who was
supporting militant extremist groups in Somalia."75 However, it
certainly appears that the crime prosecuted at great effort and cost
was, overall, a rather trivial one.
The second disclosed case seems to be even more trivial. It
involves three Muslim men, all naturalized American citizens, one in
Kansas City and two in New York. At the time of the American
invasion of Iraq in 2003, they decided they needed to fight for their
"faith and community," in the words of one of them. Four years later,
70 German, supra note 68.
71 Id; Sean Vitka, The Dragnet's Day in Court, SLATE (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future tense/2013/og/basaaly-moalin s def
ense team takes on mass nsa telephone surveillance.html.
72 Ken Dilanian, NSA Faces Backlash Over Collecting Phone Data, L.A. TIMES, July 27,
2013, http://articles.latimes.Com/2o13/jul/27/nation/la-na-nsa-politiCs-20130728.
73 Tom McCarthy, NSA Chief Says Exposure of Surveillance Programs Has 'Irreversible'
Impact-As It Happened, THE GUARDIAN (June 18, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/june/18/nsa-chief-house-hearing-surveillance-
live.
74 Nakashima, supra note 6o.
75 Mufioz, supra note 69.
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one of the men was able to connect to two apparently experienced al-
Qaeda operatives in Yemen. Hoping to join the fight in Iraq,
Afghanistan, or Somalia, the American men sent money and
equipment to their new friends in Yemen under the impression that
these would be set aside for their military training. Over several
months they sent thousands of dollars-one of them says it totaled
more than $23,000-as well as watches, cold-weather gear, some
Garmin GPS units, and a remote-controlled toy car. However, the
recipients divided the physical loot among themselves and spent the
money on (real) cars and as awards to families of Islamic martyrs. In
2oo8, the scam artists requested further payments of $45,000 which
one of them planned to use to open an appliance store. They also
suggested that the Americans were better suited to an operation in the
United States and cajoled one of them into casing the New York Stock
Exchange for a possible bombing-a "plot" that they never had any
intention of carrying out, according to the testimony of one of them.
The American did do a walk around the target, and then, several
months later, submitted a one-page report on his adventure consisting
of information that could have been gotten from Google Earth and
from tourist brochures. His handlers were unimpressed.76
In his June 2013 testimony, Joyce said identification in the case
was made not through 215, but through "702 authority."77 At the same
time, he raised interest, and then eyebrows, by dramatically
proclaiming this to be a case "that was in the very initial stages of
plotting to bomb the New York Stock Exchange." However, when
asked whether the plot was "serious," Joyce deftly dodged the issue: "I
think the jury considered it serious because they were all convicted."
As it happens, there were no jury trials: the three men all pleaded
guilty and then only to providing support to terrorism, not to the
NYSE plot (such as it was). According to another official, FBI Deputy
Director Joyce "misspoke."78
76 Mark Morris, Al-Qaeda Bunco Artist Rolls Terrorist from KC, KANSAS CITY STAR, June
29, 2013, http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article322244/A-Qaeda-bunco-artist-
rolls-terrorist-from-KC.html; Mark Morris, KC Terrorist Supported Plan to Bomb New
York Stock Exchange, FBI Tells Congress, KANSAS CITY STAR, June 18, 2013,
http://www.kansascity.Com/2013/o6/18/4299721/ke-terrorist-supported-plan-to.html.
77 House Select Intelligence Committee Holds Hearing on Disclosure of National Security
Agency Surveillance Programs (June 1, 2013) (transcript available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2o13-hr/diselosure.pdf); Ken McCarthy, NSA Chief
Says Exposure of Surveillance Programs Has 'Irreversible'Impact, THE GUARDIAN (June
18, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/18/nsa-chief-house-hearing-
surveillance-live.
78 Brian Ross, Aaron Katersky, James Gordon Meek, & Lee Ferran, NSA Claim of NYSE
Thwarted Plot Contradicted by Court Documents, ABC NEWS (June 19, 2013),
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The third disclosed case involves an American who had done
surveillance work (the value of which seems to have been fairly
limited) for terrorist gunmen who killed 166 in a suicidal rampage in
Mumbai, India, in 2oo8. He was later arrested as he was engaged in a
plot to do terrorist damage in Denmark, a plot that was beset by many
planning and financial difficulties at the time. According to
ProPublica reporter Sebastian Rotella who has done extensive
research and reporting on the case, British intelligence already had
the American under surveillance-suggesting that the Danish
enterprise would never have been allowed to be carried out. The arrest
resulted from a tip from the British, not from NSA intercepts. It does
appear, however, that previously stored NSA intercepts, presumably
from the 702 program, aided in building the legal case against the
man.
79
Only the fourth disclosed case involves a serious potential for
terrorism within the United States. This was the Zazi case of 2009 in
which three Afghan-Americans received training in Pakistan and then
returned to the United States plotting to set off bombs on the New
York subway system.
Joyce testified that a connection was made through "702
authority."8° But, as Justin Heilmann points out in a study of the
episode and as others have more recently noted, the plot in the United
States does not appear to have been disrupted so much by NSA data-
dredgers but by standard surveillance procedures implemented after
the British provided a hot tip about Zazi based on his e-mail traffic to
a known overseas terrorist address that had long been under
surveillance.1 At that point, US authorities had good reason to put the
http://abenews.go.om/Blotter/nsa-claim-thwarted-nyse-plot-contradicted-court-
documents/story?id= 19436557.
79 Sebastian Rotella, Did NSA Surveillance Help Thwart Plotter ofMumbai Attack?,
FRONTLINE (June 12, 2013), www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline. See also Nick Gillespie,
Do the Zazi and Headley Arrests Prove the Power of NSA Total Surveillance?,
REASON.COM (June 13, 2013), http://reason.com/archives/2o13/o6/13/zazi-headley-
feinstein-nsa. Joyce testified that the terrorist operative was uncovered "through 702
coverage of an al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist." Coverage of the NSA Hearings on Capitol Hill
(CNN Television Broadcast June 18, 2013) (transcript available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/13o6/18/cnr.o5.html).
80 Id.
81 Justin Heilman, Case 28: Zazi, in TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: THE AMERICAN CASES, supra
note 4, 347-55. More recent: Ben Smith, Public Documents Contradict Claim Email
Spying Foiled Terror Plot, BUZZFEED (June 7, 2013),
http://vwwv.buzzfeed.com/bensmith/public-documents-contradict -claim-email-spying-
foiled-terror. British tip: British Spies Help Prevent al Qaeda-inspired Attack on New
York Subway, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 9, 2009),
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plotters on their radar and as Senator Ron Wyden has pointed out,
"the government had all the information it needed to go to the phone
company and get an individual court order."82 Having NSA's mega-
data collection might have been helpful, but it seems scarcely to have
been required.
Actually, it is not clear that even the tip was necessary. Given the
perpetrators' limited capacities, it is questionable whether the plot
would have ever succeeded. For example, the plotters foolishly called
attention to themselves by using stolen credit cards to purchase large
quantities of potential bomb material thereby guaranteeing that the
sales would be scrutinized and security camera information preserved.
Moreover, even with his training and a set of notes at hand, Zazi,
described by a step-uncle as "a dumb kid, believe me," still apparently
couldn't figure it out, and he frantically contacted his overseas trainer
for help several times. Each of these communications was "more
urgent in tone than the last," according to court documents. 83 It was
these communications that alerted the authorities.
When presenting his four cases at the Congressional hearings in
June 2013, Alexander explained that he couldn't make the details of
all the cases on his secret list public because "If we give all those out,
we give all the secrets of how we're tracking down the terrorists as a
community, and we can't do that."' 4 The remaining 50 will remain
shrouded in secret, presumably because it is believed that discussing
them publicly would result in damage, perhaps even grave damage, to
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/6529436/British-spies-
help-prevent-al-Qaeda-inspired-attack-on-New-York-subway.html. It is conceivable that
the 702 program, PRISM, played a role in this process, but is not at all clear that this is so
or that, if so, its role was necessary. For a discussion, see Dan Amira, Did Controversial
NSA Spy Programs Really Help Prevent an Attack on the Subway?, N.Y. MAG. (June 10,
2013), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/o6/nsa-prism- zazi-subway-feinstein-
rogers-phone.html. Alexander has said that 702 was "critical," but that 215 was not
essential to the case: McCarthy, supra note 77. See also Peter Finn & Greg Miller, How an
E-mail Address Disrupted Plots in Britain and U.S., WASH. POST, June 18, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-a-shared-e-mail-address-
disrupted-plots-in-britain-and-us/2013/06/18/ebbo23c4-d84b-lle2-aoi6-
92547bfo94ccstory.html; MATFAPuzzo &ADAM GOLDMAN, ENEMIES WITHIN: INSIDE THE
NYPD's SECRET SPYING UNIT AND BIN LADEN'S FINAL PLOTAGAINST AMERICA 53-55 (2013);
Gillespie, supra note 79; Dilanian, supra note 72.
82 Nakashima, supra note 60. See also Finn & Miller, supra note 81.
83 John Mueller, Mueller on the Zazi Case: 'This is It,' INFORMED COMMENT (Nov. 4, 2009),
http://www.juancole.Com/2009/11/mueller-on-zazi-ease-this-is-it.html.
84 NSA Chief Expected To Reveal New Terror Plots; House Intelligence Committee
Hearing on Surveillance (CNN Television Broadcast June 18, 2013) (transcript available at
http://edition.enn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/13o6/18/enr.o3.html).
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national security. Accordingly, we will never be able to examine them
in our "healthy" debate on the issue of NSA surveillance.
Absent such information and keeping in mind the impressive
record of dissembling that NSA has so far amassed, it does seem to be
a reasonable suspicion-supported by the public comments of Senator
Leahy-that the four cases discussed represent not a random selection
from the list, but the best they could come up with. If that it so, the
achievements of 215 do seem to be decidedly underwhelming.
In this regard, one could also examine that set of case studies of
the 54 post-9/11 plots that have come to light by Islamist terrorists to
damage targets in the United States. s5 Since these have resulted in
public arrests and trials, there is quite a bit of information available
about them. Overall, where the plots have been disrupted, the task
was accomplished by ordinary policing methods. The NSA programs
scarcely come up at all.
At the June 2013 hearings, one committee member,
Representative Jim Himes of Connecticut, noting that his constituents
were mainly concerned about 215, tried to get Alexander and Joyce to
indicate how many plots would have been carried out but for that
program. After some evasive answers, Himes, out of time, ended by
expressing his "hope" that "you'll elucidate for us specifically case by
case how many stopped terrorist attacks" the 215 program was
"essential to."' 6 Leahy's comments suggest that the answer to that
question is perilously close to zero.s7
IV. TERMINATING 215
It certainly appears, then, that any benefit of the 215 metadata
program is very limited and is considerably outweighed by its cost,
even assuming that the unknown, and perhaps unknowable, cost
figure is quite small. The program would very likely fail a full cost-
benefit analysis handily even only minimally taking into consideration
85 TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: THE AMERICAN CASES, supra note 4.
86 House Select Intelligence Committee Holds Hearing on Disclosure of National Security
Agency Surveillence Programs (June 18, 2013) (transcript available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013-hr/diselosure.pdf).
87 This conclusion is also supported by comments by Senator Ron Wyden in his keynote
speech at the Cato Institute program, NSA Surveillance: What We Know; What to Do
About It (Oct. 9, 2013) (video available at www.cato.org/events/nsa-surveillance-what-we-
know-what-do-about-it). See also Justin Elliott, Claim on 'Attacks Thwarted' by NSA
Spreads Despite Lack of Evidence, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.propublica.org/article/claim-on-attacks-thwarted-by-nsa-spreads-despite-
lack-of-evidence.
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privacy and civil liberties concerns. Representative Adam Schiff has
done his own "on net" assessment. Even if the program is
"occasionally successful," he concludes, "there's still no justification
that I can see for obtaining that amount of data in the first place."88
Some officials have in fact acknowledged that the case for 215 is "less
compelling" and "harder to make."8 9
Although the cost of the 215 program remains classified, it is
possible to calculate how much that cost would have to be for the
program to be cost-effective. Even making some generous
assumptions about its effectiveness, the program would be cost-
effective only if its full price tag (including all the cost considerations
arrayed above) is less than $33.3 million per year.90 (The full NSA
budget, for reference, is about $1o billion.) It is difficult to quantify
the value of privacy, but it seems likely that considerably more than 33
million Americans would value their privacy enough to pay $1 a year
to have their privacy shielded from NSA 215 surveillance.
In the past, NSA has actually closed down a privacy-invading
program that had little demonstrable value in foiling terrorist plots-
though not without characteristic dissembling. James Bamford
reports that the agency had a nationwide program to store e-mail and
Internet metadata in bulk for years. It was ended in 2011 for
"operational and resource reasons," according to the director of
national intelligence. But, notes Bamford, a statement issued in 2013
by senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall contends that the real reason
the program was shut down was that the NSA was "unable" to prove
the usefulness of the operation. "We were very concerned about this
program's impact on Americans' civil liberties and privacy rights,"
they said, "And we spent a significant portion of 2011 pressing
intelligence officials to provide evidence of its effectiveness. They were
unable to do so, and the program was shut down that year." The
senators added, "It is also important to note that intelligence agencies
88 Nakashima, supra note 6o.
89 Finn & Miller, supra note 81.
90 It is assumed in this estimation that the 215 program is vital-is necessary to-the
disruption of one plot every four years that, if successfully carried out, would result in the
detonation of a very large improvised explosive device inflicting extensive damage to life
and property costing $i billion. This would be much larger than the car bomb that failed to
detonate at Times Square in 20o. As noted, the 215 program has never done so in the past.
Also assumed is that the chance the terrorist bomb would actually be successfully
detonated in the undisrupted plot is 20 percent. On the (rather low) IED success rate for
terrorists, see Matthew Grant & Mark G. Stewart, A Systems Model for Probabilistic Risk
Assessment of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks, 5 INT'L J. OF INTELLIGENT DEF.
SUPPORT Sys. 1, 75-93 (2012).
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made statements to both Congress and the [FISA court] that
significantly exaggerated this program's effectiveness. This experience
demonstrates to us that intelligence agencies' assessment of the
usefulness of particular collection program-even significant ones-
are not always accurate."91
It seems likely that "on net" (as the President puts it) the highly
controversial 215 program could safely be retired for "operational and
resource reasons" with little or no negative consequences to security.
If the 215 program has done little (and probably nothing) special to
prevent or disrupt terrorist attacks in the United States, and if we are
now having a healthy debate about the NSA programs, it seems
reasonable to suggest that, even without full information about how
the program costs, we are paying too much.
And, just possibly, there are other elements in the vast intelligence
and policing empire spawned in panic and in unseemly haste after
9/11 that might also be retired. In a major speech on the NSA
controversy in January 2014, President Obama stated, "One thing I'm
certain of. This debate will make us stronger."92 The speech contained
no suggestion about honoring the man responsible for getting the
debate going, and therefore for strengthening the United States.
However, if Snowden's debate does lead to systematic efforts to
evaluate the huge increases in homeland security that have taken
place since 2001, it will prove to be a most desirable development.
91 Bamford, supra note 25. See also LIBERTYAND SECURITY INA CHANGING WORLD, supra
note 10, at 96. Further information at Press Release from Wyden, Udall on the Disclosure
of Bulk Email Records Collection Program, (July 2, 2013) (available at
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-udall-statement-on-the-
diselosure-of-bulk-email-records-collection-program), which also includes this
observation: "We believe that the broader lesson here is that even though intelligence
officials may be well intentioned, assertions from intelligence agencies about the value and
effectiveness of particular programs should not simply be accepted at face value by
policymakers or oversight bodies... .It is up to Congress, the courts and the public to ask the
tough questions and press even experienced intelligence officials to back their assertions
up with actual evidence, rather than simply deferring to these officials' conclusions without
challenging them."
92 Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence, Department of Justice (Jan.
17, 2014) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-
president-review-signals-intelligence).
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